Buyers with high willingness to pay for quality also display strong preferences for particular brands, and require higher discounts in order to switch away from their favorite product. Therefore, competition is …ercer for buyers with lower tastes for quality, and hence more elastic demands. This is in sharp contrast to earlier models in which competition is …ercer for higher-taste, more valuable buyers. In equilibrium, …rms either compete intensively for the entire market (providing strictly positive rents to all consumers) or shut down the least pro…table segment of the market. Quality levels are distorted downwards for all buyers, except for those with the highest type. The number of competing …rms and the degree of correlation across brand preferences enhance the e¢ ciency of the allocation.
Introduction
The empirical industrial organization literature has successfully used discrete choice models of product di¤erentiation to analyze markets in which consumers have varying tastes for product characteristics. In these models, consumers'choices of brand are largely driven by the di¤erent features of the products o¤ered by each …rm: buyers with strong tastes for given product characteristics are more likely to purchase high quality items, and are willing to pay a larger premium for their favorite brand.
Theoretical models of competitive quality pricing have also been developed, mainly with the goal of analyzing …rms' choices of product characteristics and prices simultaneously. However, the existing models represent brand preferences as independent, additive shocks to the consumer's utility. An implication of this approach is that a …xed discount applied to a …rm's entire product line yields an identical increase in the sales of each item. As a consequence, estimating these models may deliver unrealistic predictions about the price elasticity of demand for di¤erent products.
In this paper, we propose a screening model in which sellers o¤er menus of contracts (nonlinear tari¤s) to buyers with private information about their preferences for both brand and quality. Brand preferences are modeled by letting each consumer's marginal utility of quality depend on the product's brand. Equivalently, we can interpret a consumer's idiosyncratic taste for a brand as the value of the match between her tastes for characteristics and the attributes of that brand's products. This implies that buyers who purchase high quality items also require higher discounts in order to switch away from their favorite brand.
The dependence of brand preferences on the purchased quality level best describes markets for products involving choices on both the intensive and the extensive margin, such as subscription plans. For example, consider cell phone plans: consumers' willingness to pay for a given carrier's plan depend on the desired usage intensity, and on some carrier-speci…c features, such as network coverage and the bundled telephones. Consumers with a higher usage intensity, who sort into plans with more free minutes, text messaging, or Internet access, assign a higher value to better network coverage. It is then reasonable to assume that consumers are willing to pay per-minute premia for their preferred carrier. As an alternative example, one might consider the market for memberships into clubs. In this case, more intensive users, who are more likely to buy higher-quality, "premium"membership packages, command a per-usage discount in order to switch clubs. 2 Our formulation of brand preferences may also be derived directly from the characteristics 1 In particular, Armstrong and Vickers (2001) , Rochet and Stole (2002) , and Yang and Ye (2008) . 2 For example, see the analysis of golf clubs'rewards programs by Hartmann and Viard (2006) , and that of airlines'frequent ‡yer programs by Lederman (2007) . approach of Lancaster (1971) , in which consumers' willingness to pay for each product is given by a weighted average of several features, rather than by a one-dimensional quality measure. In this framework, consumers' tastes and product characteristics determine the equilibrium market share of each brand. With this interpretation, our model represents a theoretical contribution towards integrating endogenous product characteristics and price discrimination in an imperfectly competitive environment.
As a concrete example, consider the market for Central Processing Units (CPU), in which buyers (e.g. computer manufacturers) have needs for performance based on characteristics such as clock speed and cache memory. In addition, each of the two leading brands (Intel and AMD) has a comparative technological advantage at one of these two characteristics. In this context, buyers sort into di¤erent brands based on their particular needs: those who assign a higher value to clock speed are willing to pay a premium for Intel's products, and the opposite is true for those consumers with a higher valuation for cache memory. It can be useful to summarize a the features of computer into a unitary measure of product quality. In this case, a consumer will naturally exhibit brand-speci…c tastes for quality. In fact, her willingness to pay for products of identical quality and di¤erent brand could not be represented by a …xed dollar amount. On the contrary, since brand preferences originate from di¤erences in product characteristics, this premium should be proportional to the quality of the goods being compared (a per-gigahertz premium, for the case of clock speed).
The results show that the equilibrium menus of contracts share the main qualitative features of the Mussa and Rosen (1978) monopoly allocation, namely e¢ cient quality provision for the highest type and quality distortions for all other types. One notable di¤erence is that …rms choose either to compete intensively for the entire market (providing strictly positive rents to all consumers) or to shut down the least pro…table segment of the market. The degree of correlation across buyers'brand preferences and the number of competing sellers have similar e¤ects on the equilibrium allocation: they increase market coverage, reduce quality distortions and increase the consumers'information rents.
In sharp contrast with other competitive screening models, our formulation of brand preferences implies that quality level o¤ered to the lowest consumer type is ine¢ ciently low. In consequence, compared to the existing papers, our model has the following implications in terms of observable variables: (i) a wider range of o¤ered quality levels, for a given distribution of consumers'tastes; and (ii) higher marginal prices for each quality level. We come back to the CPU market in section 7, and we use it as an example to illustrate these di¤erences and their implications for empirical work. Compared to our model, previous models would tend to overestimate the fraction of high valuation consumers, as well as the price sensitivity of their demand. Conversely, we …nd that our model would predict a much higher demand sensitivity for low valuation consumers. This paper is mainly related to the literature on competitive nonlinear pricing. Following the classi…cation in Stole (2007) , early theoretical contributions with single dimensional models are given by Spulber (1989) , Champsaur and Rochet (1989), and Stole (1995) . In Ellison (2005) , buyers di¤er both in taste for quality and in marginal utility of income. The more recent contributions of Armstrong and Vickers (2001) , Rochet and Stole (2002) , and Yang and Ye (2008) use multidimensional models to capture uncertainty both over brand preferences and taste for quality. In particular, the three latter papers assume that buyers'types have both a horizontal component (measuring brand preferences) and a vertical component (measuring taste for quality). We discuss these papers at length in section 7.
Our approach to brand preferences is also related to the theoretical and empirical discrete choice models of product di¤erentiation, such as those in Perlo¤ and Salop (1985) , Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse (1992) , and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) . It is even more closely related to Berry and Pakes (2007) , who develop a pure-characteristics demand model which removes the additive shocks and only de…nes consumers'preferences over a set of product characteristics. Song (2007) adopts a pure-characteristics framework to estimate consumer demand and welfare in the CPU market. Nonlinear pricing with competition is also the object of a growing number of papers in empirical industrial organization. This strand of the literature includes the works of Miravete and Röller (2004) and Miravete (2009) on the cellular telephone industry, the paper by Busse and Rysman (2005) on the yellow pages industry, and the work of McManus (2007) on competing co¤ee chains.
The Model
Consider an imperfectly competitive market and let I = f1; : : : ; i; : : : Ig be the set of (identical) sellers. Let there also be a continuum of buyers with unit demands. Buyers di¤er in their valuation of the quality of the goods produced by each …rm. A type for a buyer is a vector of valuations = ( 1 ; :::; I ) 2 R I : Buyer types are distributed on [ L ; H ] I according to a distribution function F ( ) with a strictly positive and continuously di¤erentiable density
The utility of a type buyer, consuming a good of quality q i , produced by …rm i and sold at price p i is given by
We can view each type component i as the value of the match between consumer and the products of …rm i. Consequently, a type buyer is willing to pay a premium of ( i j ) q for an item of quality q produced by …rm i rather than by …rm j. In other words, consumers are willing to pay brand-speci…c premia that are proportional to product quality. It follows that demand for high quality products is less sensitive to absolute price reductions than demand for low quality items. It can be useful to contrast (1) with the utility function commonly adopted in the literature on competitive screening. This literature de…nes a buyer type as (t; x) = (t; x 1 ; :::; x I ) 2 R I+1 . The utility of type (t; x), when consuming a good of quality q i produced by …rm i and sold at price p i is given by
Suppose that both …rms i and j o¤er product q at price p: Under demand speci…cation (2), a type (t; x) buyer is willing to pay x i x j more for …rm i's item independently of the quality level q. It follows that demand functions for high quality and high price items are more sensitive to equal percentage discounts than the corresponding demand functions for low quality items. Our utility function formulation (1) can also be obtained from a more general model, in which preferences are de…ned over a vector of product characteristics, as in Berry and Pakes (2007) . In this context, a brand is identi…ed by a combination of characteristics, while quality represents a scaling decision for products with similar combinations of characteristics. The rest of this paper works directly with the reduced form utility function (1), but we will come back to the product characteristics interpretation in section 6.
Each …rm i 2 I can produce goods of quality q i with the same technology c (q i ), which satis…es c (0) = 0, as well as c 0 (q i ) > 0 and c 00 (q i ) > 0 for all q i . If each …rm i chooses a nonlinear tari¤ p i (q i ), the indirect utility of a type consumer when purchasing from …rm i is given by
Let U 0 ( ) denote the consumer's outside option and assume that U 0 ( ) = 0 for all types : A type consumer chooses to make her purchase from …rm i whenever this …rm provides her the highest net utility,
) for all j = 0; 1; :::; I.
Firm i's market segment is de…ned as the set of types purchasing from i:
Denote by q i ( ) the quality level (possibly zero) purchased by type from …rm i. Each …rm i then seeks to maximize pro…ts:
Menu Pricing
As buyers have unit demands, we analyze competition among I sellers in an exclusive dealing framework. Throughout the paper, we maintain the assumption that …rms o¤er deterministic menus of contracts. Under this assumption, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to direct mechanisms. Furthermore, in these mechanisms, each …rm i only conditions its price and quality o¤er on the buyer's relevant type component i . The reason for this result lies in the separability of the agent's preferences. Under utility function (1), the agent's ranking of items within each …rm's menu is una¤ected by the menus o¤ered by other …rms. Therefore, following Martimort and Stole (2002) , …rms cannot bene…t from o¤ering out of equilibrium contracts, i.e. price-quality pairs that are not chosen by any type in equilibrium. Restricting the message space to the type space then entails no loss of generality. Furthermore, since all types = ( i ; ) have the same preferences over the items in …rm i's menu, …rm i is unable to screen over all type components j 6 = i . We can therefore restrict attention to menu o¤ers in which the agent only reports type component i to each …rm i. This feature of our model does not require any assumption on the distribution of types (e.g. independence). In fact, if type components were correlated, then each …rm i would derive additional information about the buyer's reservation utility from the revelation of i . This information would certainly a¤ect the terms of the o¤er the …rm makes to each type i . However, the …rm could not possibly use this information to further screen consumers, since it lacks the instruments to discriminate among types with identical i and di¤erent i .
Therefore, each …rm's optimal nonlinear pricing problem may be solved with the traditional techniques of one-dimensional screening. In a direct mechanism, each …rm's price and quality o¤er is a function of the buyer's reported type^ i : The utility of a type i buyer who reports^ i when buying from …rm i may be written in the usual form:
Normalize the buyers' reservation utility to zero, and write the individual rationality constraint as
Now de…ne each …rm's utility provision schedule as
The incentive compatibility constraints for the …rm's problem are then given by the consumer's …rst-and second-order conditions for truthful revelation of her type. By standard arguments, these are equivalent to:
Consider a pro…le of incentive-compatible menus fq
The incentive compatibility constraints (4) and (5) imply the indirect utility function U i ( i ) is strictly increasing. Therefore, a buyer of type chooses …rm i whenever her taste i for brand i is su¢ ciently large, relative her other type components j6 =i . We can then characterize the market share of …rm i through a vector of I 1 threshold types j . Fixing a type component i , the threshold j represents the lowest taste for brand j that would induce consumer = ( i ; ) to prefer …rm j over …rm i. The threshold types are de…ned as follows:
Notice that the set of types = ( i ; ) that choose to purchase from …rm i depends on the utility level U ( i ) assigned to type i and on the entire utility schedules U j ( j ) o¤ered by …rms j 6 = i. If we let f i ( i ) denote the marginal density of type component i , we can then use equation (6) 
Figure 1 provides an illustration of the market segments in the case of a duopoly, when types are distributed on the unit square. Finally, de…ne the total surplus generated by providing quality q i to type i as
Given the strategy pro…le fq j ( j ) ; U j ( j )g j6 =i of all …rms j 6 = i, each seller i solves the following problem:
s.t. (3), (4), and (5).
The …rm's objective function di¤ers substantially from the Mussa and Rosen (1978) monopoly problem. The di¤erences are mainly due to the e¤ect of buyers'brand-speci…c tastes on the competition among sellers. In particular, each …rm's allocation of buyer types is endogenously determined, meaning that …rms can acquire larger market shares by o¤ering higher utility levels. For a given strategy pro…le fq
, the utility levels o¤ered by …rms j 6 = i in ‡uence the fraction of types ( i ; ) served in equilibrium by …rm i. In other words, market shares measure sales of products of quality q i ( i ) by …rm i. The market share function M i (U i ( i ) ; U i ; i ) given in (7) may then be viewed as a weighted average of the initial marginal distribution f i ( i ) that places a higher weight on high i types. Clearly, because …rms split the market, the weights do not sum to one.
Symmetric Equilibrium
We now present the necessary conditions for a symmetric equilibrium, and their implications for the properties of the solution. To simplify the notation, we now drop the subscript i from the …rms'strategies, and (with a slight abuse of notation) we let type components i be identically and independently distributed according to a univariate distribution F ( i ). We extend the analysis to the case of correlation in section 6.
The necessary conditions for a symmetric equilibrium can be expressed as a second-order di¤erential equation in U ( i ). For greater clarity, Proposition 1 presents them in terms of both functions q ( i ) and U ( i ), which are linked by incentive compatibility constraint (4), or equivalently by condition (10) in what follows.
Proposition 1 (Necessary Conditions)
The necessary …rst-order conditions for quality and utility provision at a di¤erentiable symmetric equilibrium are given by:
where
with the boundary condition
The transversality condition (11) delivers the well-known "no distortion at the top"result. In the Mussa and Rosen (1978) monopolistic price discrimination model, the …rm extracts all the rent from the lowest type in the distribution. The equilibrium nonlinear tari¤ may therefore be found using the boundary conditions (11) and U ( L ) = 0.
In a competitive environment, this second boundary condition is no longer valid, because information rents have a positive impact on market shares and may therefore increase pro…ts. In particular, as shown in condition (10), the utility of the lowest type U ( L ) shifts the entire rent function U ( i ). As such, it represents a free endpoint for the …rm's problem. This immediately allows us to conclude that the shadow value of the incentive compatibility constraint (4) must be zero at L . In the Rochet and Stole (2002) model, in the absence of bunching, this condition delivers the "no distortion at the bottom"result. This is not the case in our model, where the di¤erential equation (9) has a singularity at L . This occurs because …rm i's market share of types i = L is equal to zero, since the probability of another type component j6 =i being larger than L is equal to one. As we show in the Appendix, this implies that shadow value of the incentive compatibility constraint (4) is equal to zero independently of the level of q L . Therefore, e¢ cient quality provision at the bottom of the distribution is not an equilibrium feature in the brand-speci…c tastes model.
Indeed, as we show in Proposition 2, the quality level served to the lowest type in equilibrium must be distorted downwards from the e¢ cient level. This feature of the equilibrium brings the monopoly and oligopoly results closer together, and represents the key novel implication of the brand-speci…c tastes model. We stress that this feature of our model extends to the case of correlation across type components, as long as Pr ( j > L j i = L ) = 1 for all i and j.
Proposition 2 (Lowest Type)
1. If the market is covered in equilibrium, the utility level of the lowest type is given by
2. The quality level provided to the lowest type is distorted downward (
).
An implication of Proposition 2 is that a symmetric equilibrium cannot involve both positive quality provision and full surplus extraction at the bottom of the distribution. To gain some intuition about this result, observe that the provision of positive quality levels to any type i requires the …rms to incur in the shadow cost of the incentive constraints for all higher types. Not providing a type with a strictly positive utility level e¤ectively means making zero sales. Therefore, o¤ering positive quality and zero utility (as in the monopoly case) bears only costs and no bene…ts to the …rm.
Perhaps more importantly, condition (12) in Proposition 2 allows us to rule out e¢ cient quality provision at the bottom (
If that were the case, direct substitution into (12) would immediately imply that …rms leave the entire surplus S (q ( L ) ; L ) to the buyer, thereby obtaining zero pro…t margins on the lowest type. 4 Per se, this is not su¢ cient to rule out e¢ ciency at the bottom, because each …rm i never actually serves any consumer with i = L . Furthermore, we know from condition (10) that U ( L ) is chosen optimally, taking into account its e¤ect on the entire rent function U ( i ), and that competition is …ercer for the lower types, which are more price-elastic. Therefore, it is not a priori clear that lowering the utility of the lowest type (i:e: shifting the rent function down) can increase the …rm's pro…ts. However, as we show in the Appendix, e¢ cient quality provision at the bottom would imply that pro…t margins on types i in a neighborhood of L vanish faster than …rm i's equilibrium market share. Intuitively, the …rm can then pro…tably raise prices (at the expense of market shares) and obtain positive pro…ts in a neighborhood of L . The positive distortions result brings our model closer to the …ndings of Yang and Ye (2008) . The main di¤erence with this paper is that Yang and Ye (2008) assume vertical types t are uniformly distributed on [0; 1] : As a result, a set of lowest types are inevitably shut down, because they provide a cost in terms of incentives, and no surplus. Quality distortions are then a consequence of shut down. In other words, the main novel element of our …ndings is that quality distortions arise even under full market coverage.
In addition to these economic insights, Proposition 2 allows us to use (12) as boundary condition, together with (11), to solve for the symmetric equilibrium under the hypothesis of full market coverage. In the alternative case, in which all types i below a lower threshold 0 are excluded in equilibrium, we can use (11) together with boundary conditions U ( 0 ) = 0 and q ( 0 ) = 0, in order to solve (9).
In the Appendix, we provide two di¤erent algorithms to compute the solution in the cases of full and partial market coverage, respectively.
5 These algorithms include a simple procedure, based on a result by Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1977) , to verify the su¢ ciency of our system (9)-(11). There are two main di¢ culties associated with analytically checking these conditions: the …rst one arises because a closed form solution to the …rst-order conditions can only be obtained in a few special cases; the second one originates from the equilibrium functional form of market shares, which (when all …rms j 6 = i adopt the same strategy) is given by
. This makes it di¢ cult to show the concavity of the objective function in the information rents. The Appendix contains a duopoly example, with uniformly distributed types and quadratic costs, which admits a closed-form solution and for which we verify the second order conditions analytically. Both for this reason, and for tractability, we now specialize the model by introducing these two assumptions.
Uniform-Quadratic Model
Throughout this section, we maintain the following assumptions:
These restrictions allow us to clearly separate our results with those of Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) , and to provide some insights into the comparative statics of the equilibrium nonlinear prices with respect to the number of competing …rms. Assessing the e¤ects of competition requires some attention. First, because our model lacks a general existence and uniqueness result, we need to rely on numerical solutions to ensure that the comparative statics exercise is well-founded. Second, increasing the number of …rms enhances competition, but also multiplies the preference space of the consumer and the potential social surplus. This e¤ect is similar to what happens in discrete choice models, where consumers have preferences over product characteristics. In that context, the e¤ect of introducing a new product depends on the degree of similarity with the existing ones. In section 6, we relate the degree of similarity of the underlying product characteristics to the correlation among brand-speci…c taste parameters. In the case of positive correlation, the e¤ects of enlarging the preference space are then clearly dampened. Indeed, the e¤ects of introducing new brands are most stark in the independent types case. As such, the analysis under the independence assumption provides a benchmark, and a lower bound, on the competitive e¤ects of increasing the number of …rms.
The e¤ect of a higher number of competitors need not a priori dominate the stochastic improvement in the distribution of consumers'valuations.
6 Therefore, in the uniform-quadratic model, we vary the number of products I, and we contrast the case of competition with the multiproduct monopolist's solution. The following results assume (and numerically validate this assumption) that there is a unique solution to the …rst order conditions, and that the second order conditions are satis…ed. In particular, Proposition 3 compares the e¤ect of an increase in the number of brands I in the cases of competition and multiproduct monopoly. In order to facilitate this comparison of the equilibrium menus, we solve the monopolist's problem under the assumptions of anonymous pricing. This corresponds to forcing the monopolist to literally posting I menus of contracts. Formally, this means we restrict the direct mechanisms o¤ered by the monopolist to o¤er the same set of price-quality options to all buyers, regardless of their reported types.
Proposition 3 (Comparative Statics) Assume (9)-(11) admit a unique solution, which is in fact an equilibrium.
1. In the competitive model, as the number of …rms I increases:
(a) market coverage (weakly) increases; (b) utility provision (weakly) increases for all buyer types; (c) quality provision (weakly) increases for all buyer types.
2. In the monopoly model, as the number of products I increases, the quality and utility levels q i ( i ) and U i ( i ) decrease for all i .
Consider …rst the multiproduct monopolist's problem. Since consumers have unit demand, restricting attention to anonymous pricing schemes reduces the monopolist's problem to one of one-dimensional screening. Each product i's market share of consumers is given by M i = f : i = max j2I ( j )g. In other words, each product i is sold as if the monopolist were facing a population of consumers distributed according to F I ( i ). Therefore the quality schedules are given by
Proposition 3 shows that the number of products yields an increase in the magnitude of the quality distortions. In terms of indirect utility, buyers may either gain or lose. In particular, each consumer draws a taste parameter for the new product. If this new type component is not high enough, her utility will decrease. Similarly, the e¤ect on overall market coverage is ambiguous, as each individual product sells to fewer buyer types, but new products capture a share of the market as well. The reasons for the di¤erent comparative statics results in the competitive and monopoly models lie in the opportunity cost of providing utility. In the monopoly case, there are no gains in terms of market shares. An increase in the number of products only enlarges the preference space. This creates the possibility for the …rm to exploit the gains from additional product variety. In the competitive case, an increase in the number of …rms I a¤ects both the size and the composition of each …rm's equilibrium market shares. The size of the overall market shares obviously decreases, reducing both the costs and the bene…ts of providing extra utility in a similar fashion. However, an increase in competition also increases the proportion consumers with a higher i served by each …rm. This means that the provision of utility at the top of the distribution is now more rewarding. As a consequence, the incentive compatibility requirements of distorting quality for low i types are less stringent, resulting in higher utility everywhere. In other words, as I increases, the equilibrium quality levels move towards the e¢ cient levels and the agents'rents increase. Qualities remain distorted downward at the bottom of the distribution, but the range of quality levels o¤ered in equilibrium decreases.
In Figure 2 , we show the equilibrium quality levels when i 2 [1; 3] for the case of competition (left panel) and multiproduct monopoly (right panel).
The forces underlying the comparative statics results in our model di¤er sharply from those in other models of nonlinear pricing with spatial competition.
7 These models adopt a linear-city or circular-city framework. As a consequence, …rms directly compete only with their "neighbors." By allowing a more general formulation of brand preferences, our model allows for "global" competition among several …rms, as is the case in the applied discretechoice literature. The extent to which two rival …rms are competing is then determined by the speci…c distribution of consumers'brand preferences. Finally, we point out that in the uniform quadratic model, the entire market is served, and the lowest type i = L receives exactly zero quality when the following relationship is satis…ed:
As we show in the Appendix, in this case the system of …rst-order conditions for a symmetric equilibrium has an analytic solution characterized by linear quality provision:
For example, in Figure 2 (left), the analytic solution is obtained for I = 3, H = 3, L = 1.
The following corollary can then be derived from Proposition 3.
Corollary 1 (Market Coverage) Assume (9)-(11) admit a unique solution, which is in fact an equilibrium. Then the market is fully covered if and only if I 2 ( H = L ) 3.
An equivalent interpretation of this result suggests that whenever the ratio of L to H exceeds a critical value the equilibrium involves the provision of strictly positive utility to all types. Conversely, whenever the ratio of L to H falls short of the critical value, (3=2 + I=2), the equilibrium involves the shutdown of the lowest types. For the case of a duopoly, the threshold is equal to 2=5, which for example is lower than the threshold of 1=2 obtained in the Mussa and Rosen (1978) monopoly model.
Correlated Types and Product Characteristics
Correlation across brand preferences directly a¤ects the intensity of competition by in ‡uenc-ing the distribution of buyers'outside options. In particular, positive and negative correlation may be expected to respectively increase and relax competition between …rms.
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In this section, we derive the necessary conditions for a symmetric equilibrium. These conditions generalize those in Proposition 1. They also serve as a building block for the analysis of the link between product characteristics and brand preferences. We show that brands selling products with similar characteristics generate positively correlated tastes for quality, and provide an illustration of this link through an example with a bivariate normal type distribution.
Symmetric Equilibrium Conditions
Assume that types is distributed over [ L ; H ] I according to a symmetric distribution F ( ) with density f ( ). Analogously to the independence case, …x a pro…le
of incentive-compatible menus and a seller i. The indi¤erent types j (U i ( i ) ; U j ) are de…ned as in (6). Firm i's market share of participating types ( i ; ) may be written as
As noted in section 3, the distribution of types does not a¤ect the buyer's ranking of the items within each …rm's menu. The …rms'incentive compatibility and individual rationality 8 The case of perfect negative correlation has been analyzed by Spulber (1989) , who …nds that …rms operate in a local monopolies regime. The case of perfect positive correlation has been analyzed by Champsaur and Rochet (1989) , who introduce vertical di¤erentiation by letting …rms choose quality ranges …rst, and then compete in nonlinear prices.
constraints are therefore unchanged and …rm i's objective function may be formulated as follows:
The …rst order conditions for a symmetric equilibrium are then stated in the following proposition. Let ( i ) denote the multiplier on the incentive compatibility constraint (4) for each …rm i.
Proposition 4 (Necessary Conditions with Correlation)
:
In the Appendix, we provide a duopoly example based on the Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern copula (see Nelsen (2006) for more details), in which the degree of correlation is small. We show that the qualitative properties of the equilibrium under independence carry over to the case of correlation. One drawback of using the FMG copula is that it only allows for low values of correlation. We consider higher degrees of correlation in the next example. Before we do so, we demonstrate how brand-speci…c tastes for quality may be derived from a pure characteristics demand model. We then apply the equilibrium conditions from this subsection to this new "micro-founded"model.
Product Characteristics
Consider a hedonic oligopoly model in which products are de…ned as bundles of characteristics x 2 R K with K 2: Let k be the consumer's marginal utility of consuming characteristic k: The utility of a buyer consuming product x = (x 1 ; :::; x K ) is then given by:
This speci…cation is virtually identical to the one adopted in the pure characteristics demand model of Berry and Pakes (2007) . In contrast with the earlier discrete-choice em-pirical literature, which takes all product characteristics as given, we assume that each …rm can produce several di¤erent quality levels of its variant of the product. We de…ne …rm i's variant of the product as a bundle of characteristics i = ( i1 ; :::; iK ). In other words, …rm i's production possibility set is given by the i ray in R K .
Y i = x 2 R K : x = (q i1 ; :::; q iK ) ; q 2 R + .
Production costs are expressed in terms of quality levels q only. This formulation allows one to identify a brand with an exogenously determined variant of the product, and quality with an endogenously chosen scaling parameter that distinguishes products of the same brand. The utility of a consumer with preferences is then given by
We can now de…ne
and obtain the original formulation of brand-speci…c tastes for quality (1) from preferences over product characteristics. The degree of heterogeneity between …rms' variants i is an index of product di¤erentiation and, as such, measures the intensity of competition in the market. When adopting the original formulation (1), given an initial distribution of buyers' tastes for characteristics, the degree of similarity between …rms'variants is directly related to the degree of correlation between brand-speci…c taste parameters in the population. In order to obtain a tractable model with a symmetric equilibrium, we only need to ensure that all type components i are distributed over the same support. This can be achieved by assuming that P k ik = a for all i and that the distribution of each component k has the same support. To summarize, the brand-speci…c model represents a concise way of summarizing tastes for characteristics into a single dimensional brand-speci…c index. We now illustrate an example based on the multivariate normal distribution.
The Multivariate Normal Case
Let tastes for each characteristic k be identically and independently distributed according to the following normal density:
De…ne …rm i's variant of the product by i = ( i1 ; i2 ). The two …rms'production possibility sets are then given by:
Brand-speci…c tastes can therefore be de…ned as:
Under the normal distribution assumption for k , the brand speci…c tastes ( 1 ; 2 ) are jointly normally distributed with mean vector m = (( 11 + 12 ) ; ( 21 + 22 ) ) , and dispersion matrix
2 ) denotes the variance of each type component. The correlation coe¢ cient is given by = 1 2 k 1 kk 2 k = cos (t), where t denotes the angle between the two characteristics vectors ( 11 ; 12 ) and ( 21 ; 22 ). Therefore, in this model, the degree of similarity between the two …rms'variants of the product determines the correlation coe¢ cient between the consumers'tastes, and hence the intensity of competition on the market. For example, if …rms characteristics are collinear, the brand-speci…c tastes are perfectly correlated, and Bertrand equilibria are obtained. If characteristics are orthogonal, types are independent, and the analysis is identical to that of section 4.
To apply these …ndings, consider an example in which types i follow a symmetric bivariate normal distribution. In particular, we make the following assumptions on consumers' preferences ( ) and …rms'variants ( i ):
In other words, we let each taste parameter k be distributed according to a standard normal, and we assume that variants of the product lie on the unit radius circle. Under these assumptions, the type vector is distributed according to a bivariate normal with We now use the symmetric equilibrium conditions derived above to characterize the solution of this model for di¤erent values of . In order to compute a numerical solution, we need to truncate the distribution of each type component at a common upper bound ( H ). It may be easily shown that the truncation point only a¤ects the terminal conditions and not the di¤erential equations governing the solution. The probability density function is then given by
which means that the market share function may be expressed in closed form via the error function erf ( i ). In Figure 3 , we let costs be quadratic, and let the correlation parameter take values in the set f 0:8; 0; 0:8g. The numerical results con…rm the intuition that positive correlation across type components increases the e¢ ciency of the quality supply schedules. Quite surprisingly, even values of the correlation coe¢ cient as high as 0:8 do not dramatically improve the e¢ ciency of the allocation. In the opposite case of negative correlation, low types'outside options are higher, and for some parameter values the equilibrium quality provision lies below the monopoly level.
Comparison with the Literature
The papers most closely related to the present work are those by Armstrong and Vickers (2001) , Rochet and Stole (2002) , and Yang and Ye (2008) . As alluded to previously, in these papers buyers value quality uniformly, and their brand preferences are given by seller-speci…c additive utility shocks (see utility function formulation (2)). These shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated with the quality of the purchased product, and distributed independently from the tastes for quality in the population. Thus, these models separate the consumer's "vertical"preferences over veri…able product quality from her "horizontal"brand preferences. However, as a result, the relative value of purchasing products of similar quality from di¤erent …rms is independent of the quality of the chosen products. We now illustrate the di¤erent the theoretical results of these papers and our model. We then turn to their empirical predictions and discuss the implications of taking each model to the data, in the context of the CPU market example.
Model Predictions
The main apparent di¤erence between our results and those of Rochet and Stole (2002) lies in the equilibrium quality schedules. When the market is covered, Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) predict the e¢ cient quality levels are produced in equilibrium. When not all types (t L ; ) participate, the Rochet and Stole (2002) allocation is characterized by e¢ ciency at the top and at bottom. This is in contrast with our result in Proposition 2, which predicts quality distortions for all types, including L . This di¤erence is due to the equilibrium composition of market shares, and to their sensitivity to prices in the two models. To clarify this point, remember that in the Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) models, at a symmetric equilibrium with full market coverage, each …rm serves a constant fraction of all vertical types t. In equilibrium, each …rm e¤ectively serves a population of consumers whose types are distributed according to (1=I) f (t). Conversely, in the symmetric equilibrium of our model, types in the market segment of …rm i are distributed according to F I 1 ( i ) f ( i ), which indicates a relatively larger presence of high types.
To obtain a meaningful comparison between the di¤erent models, we appropriately modify the initial distributions of types. In particular, consider the model in Yang and Ye (2008) , which extends the one in Rochet and Stole (2002) to the case of imperfect market coverage. Vertical types t in the model of Yang and Ye (2008) all types t, market shares are de…ned by x (U i (t) ; U j (t)), which is the solution to:
At a symmetric equilibrium, over the full coverage region, market shares are equal to onehalf. Furthermore, the sensitivity of market shares to utility provision is constant and equal to @x (U i (t) ; U j (t)) @U i (t) = 1 2 8t.
In our model, let type components i be distributed according to
. As in the model of Yang and Ye (2008) , the equilibrium market share of each …rm is given by F ( i ) f ( i ) = 1=2: However, in the present work, market shares are determined by the solution to U j ( j ) = U i : Therefore, their sensitivity to utility provision is given by
Since quality is an increasing function of type, utility provision has a positive but declining e¤ect on market shares. In other words, the value to …rm i of providing additional utility to high-valuation types is much lower than in Yang and Ye (2008) , because those types require larger discounts in order to switch brands. Figure 4 , panel (b), compares our equilibrium allocation with the model in Yang and Ye (2008) , holding constant the composition of the equilibrium market shares. Distortions are greater in the present work, despite the stochastically dominated initial distribution of types. We can then conclude that di¤erences in the sensitivity of market shares drive the main qualitative di¤erences between the two classes of models.
Implications for Observable Variables
The most immediate implication of quality distortions in terms of observable variables concerns the variety of products o¤ered by each …rm. In particular, when the market is covered and there is no bunching, our model predicts a wider range of product qualities than the previous models. Quite simply, the upper bound on quality is identical ( H = c 0 (q H )), while the lowest o¤ered quality is below the e¢ cient level for the lowest type (
A more subtle implication of quality distortions is related to the actual nonlinear prices
Under our linear utility speci…cation, the marginal price charged for each quality level is equal to the type of the consumer buying that product. This is most clearly seen from the …rst order condition for type 's choice from …rm i's menu,
More severe quality distortions imply that a given quality level is assigned to a highervaluation buyer, and hence it is sold at a higher marginal price. To illustrate the di¤erence with the Rochet and Stole (2002) model, Figure 5 shows the equilibrium marginal prices, when types i (and vertical types t) are distributed uniformly on [4; 5]. Quality, q Marginal Prices, dp(q)/dq Rochet and Stole Brand-Specific Tastes 
Inference from Data
In the Rochet and Stole (2002) and in our model, the econometrician can use price and quality data, together with the …rst-order condition for the consumer's problem (18) to make inference about the valuations of the consumers buying each product. For example, if the utility function is assumed to be known, the highest and lowest marginal prices identify H and L .
In addition, if data on production costs is available, the presence of quality distortions at the top and at the bottom of the menu can be tested directly. This is the case, for example, of McManus (2007), who studies specialty co¤ee chains, and …nds no distortions at the top of the menu (large, sweet espresso drinks), and positive distortions in the size of all other co¤ee products. He interprets the diminishing distortions towards the bottom as evidence of more intense competition for these items. The results of McManus (2007) are in line with the …ndings of Proposition 2, as well as with the our model's feature of more price-sensitive demand for buyers of low-quality items.
In the absence of information on cost, but with knowledge of each product's market share, the existing models and the present work can yield very di¤erent estimates of the distribution of valuations and of demand elasticity. We illustrate these di¤erences in the context of our motivating example of the CPU market. In this market, the relevant product characteristics are clock speed and cache memory. Table 1 summarizes these features for the main Intel and AMD processors for sale in 2007. Consistent with our approach in section 6.2, AMD processors generally run faster than their Intel counterparts, but have a smaller cache memory. A competitive nonlinear pricing model may be employed to analyze the two …rms'choices of product characteristics and prices simultaneously. In particular, the present model would construct a separate quality measure for each brand, by considering di¤erent linear combinations of clock speed and cache memory. Conversely, the existing models are based on a one dimensional vertical type. Thus, they would de…ne quality as a linear combination of the two characteristics which is common to both brands.
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In both models, the observed market shares provide information on the underlying distribution of consumers'valuations for each product. The main di¤erence in this respect is that the Rochet and Stole (2002) model would attribute each purchase of a high quality product to a "high t"type, and explain the choice of brand entirely through consumer-…rm …xed e¤ects (equivalently, the logit errors). Conversely, our model would recognize that consumers sort based on their idiosyncratic needs, and hence that the observed market shares correspond to a selected sample of consumers.
10 In other words, some high-quality purchases should be attributed to consumers with a particularly high taste for one brand, but not for the other. Therefore, our model would yield much lower estimates of the number of consumers with uniformly high valuations. This is a general feature of empirical applications of discrete choice models, but in particular of Song (2007) , who considers a one-dimensional pure characteristics approach, and of Hendel (1999) , who matches buyer characteristics with product characteristics in a multinomial logit model. Finally, in order to explain the observed marginal prices, the Rochet and Stole (2002) model would estimate a single transportation cost parameter for all vertical types t. Instead in the present model, the degree of horizontal di¤erentiation is implicit in the distribution of brand preferences. As shown in section 6.2, this distribution summarizes the buyers'tastes for characteristics and the properties of each brand's products. Compared to the Rochet and Stole (2002) results, the implied sensitivity of demand will be much lower at the top of the type distribution. For example, if a consumer of the top Intel product (QX6700) were to switch to AMD, she would most likely choose the FX-72 or FX-74, which have considerably di¤erent characteristics (most notably, half as much cache memory). Even though these products might have very similar quality levels q IN T EL and q AM D , this buyer requires a very large discount in order to consider switching brands. Conversely, market share sensitivity is higher towards the bottom, where absolute di¤erences in product characteristics are smaller.
Conclusion
This paper develops a competitive nonlinear pricing model, where the buyers'valuation of quality depends on the product's brand. In particular, buyers of high quality items are willing to pay larger brand premia, leading to a lower price elasticity for high quality items. In the symmetric equilibrium, brand-speci…c tastes for quality restore the quality distortions that may be absent from earlier random participation models, and rule out the possibility of marginal cost pricing. However, our model does not nest those of Armstrong and Vickers (2001) , Rochet and Stole (2002) and Yang and Ye (2008) , and is to be considered a complement rather than substitute to their approach. Another contribution of this paper is to build a tighter connection between the empirical and theoretical literature on di¤erentiated products oligopoly. In particular, it relates the pure characteristics demand model of Berry and Pakes (2007) to a competitive nonlinear pricing problem. Under particular functional forms, the resulting screening model with correlated types may be solved for a symmetric equilibrium. This allows us to trace out the implications of consumers'preferences over multidimensional product characteristics, when …rms simultaneously choose prices and qualities.
A natural extension of our model considers a dynamic game in which product characteristics are determined in a …rst stage and competitive price discrimination (e.g. through two-part tari¤s) takes place in the second stage. Another, more ambitious extension consists of integrating proportional and additive brand preference components in the consumer's choice problem. At present, these extensions constitute the object of further research, but both represent important steps towards adopting the present model for empirical work.
Proof of Proposition 2: (1.) Consider the necessary conditions (9)-(11) and drop the argument ( i ). Rearranging condition (9) one obtains:
which holds for all i > L . Since both F and f are assumed to be continuously di¤erentiable, and f > 0 for all i , by the continuity of U , we have
Therefore, taking the limit of the right hand side of expression (23) as i ! L , we can conclude that:
which is strictly positive for all q > 0 since c (q) is strictly convex.
(2.) No …rm o¤ers qualities in excess of the socially e¢ cient level, as it could o¤er the same utility levels at a lower cost by reducing quality. Therefore, we seek to rule out the following allocation:
De…ne the pro…t margin on type i as
Suppose towards a contradiction that c 0 (q ( L )) = L .Condition (12) immediately implies ( L ) = 0. Di¤erentiating and using the incentive compatibility constraint (4), we obtain
At a symmetric equilibrium, …rst order condition (21) may be written as
Both q ( i ) and f ( i ) are strictly positive. Therefore, as i ! L , condition (24) implies that the second term in (25) goes to zero at rate (d i ) I . Conversely, the …rst term goes to zero at rate (d i ) I 1 . Consequently, there exists an " > 0 such that
since …rst order condition (20) implies ( L ) = 0: But then …rst order condition (20) also implies the …rm is o¤ering quality c 0 (q ( L + ")) > L + ", which is in excess of the e¢ cient level and clearly sub-optimal.
We now use restriction (12) from Proposition 2 to implement two algorithms to compute the symmetric equilibrium.
Computing the solution under full market coverage: First, choose an initial value q 0 for q ( L ) on [ L ; H ]. Then solve the system using c 0 (q ( H )) = H and q ( L ) = q 0 as boundary conditions, and verify whether condition (12) holds. If it does, then the equilibrium has the desired properties; otherwise, adjust the initial value for q 0 and go back to the …rst step. This procedure must be repeated until the right-hand side of (12) converges to the corresponding U ( L ; q 0 ). The limit q 0 , along with the associated schedules q ( i ) and U ( i ), result in the computed equilibrium. To verify that the second order conditions are satis…ed, use …rst order condition (20) to compute the equilibrium value of ( i ). Then check that the computed q ( i ) and U ( i ) maximize the modi…ed Lagrangean of Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1977) :
Computing the solution under partial market coverage: First, choose an initial value for 0 on [ L ; H ]. Then solve the system using c 0 (q ( H )) = H and U ( 0 ) = 0 as boundary conditions and verify whether the condition q ( 0 ) = 0 holds or not. If it does, then the equilibrium has the desired properties; otherwise, adjust the initial value for 0 and go back to the …rst step. This procedure must be repeated until q ( 0 ) converges to zero. The limit 0 , along with the associated schedules q ( i ) and U ( i ), result in the computed equilibrium.
To verify that the second order conditions are satis…ed, use …rst order condition (20) to compute the equilibrium value of ( i ). Then check that the computed q ( i ) and U ( i ) maximize the modi…ed Lagrangean given in (26).
The following lemmas are instrumental to the proof of Proposition 3.
Lemma 1 Under the quadratic costs assumption (13), if q 0 ( i ) (>) 1 for all
Proof of Lemma 1: We know that U 0 ( i ) = q ( i ) by incentive compatibility and that
Lemma 2 Under the uniform distribution and the quadratic cost assumptions (13)- (14),
Proof of Lemma 2: We know from Lemma 1 that if there is a type i such that U ( i ) > q 2 ( i ) =2, then there must also exist a type 0 i i for which q 0 ( 0 i ) < 1. Furthermore, notice that notice that, under assumptions (13)- (14), equation (23) may be re-written as follows:
In particular, this implies the following:
Two cases are possible. (27) and (28) 
, then consider the di¤erence between the two functions U ( i ) and
The two conditions q 2 ( Proof of Proposition 3: (1.) Assume that types are uniformly distributed and let the number of …rms I increase. We want to show that (a) market coverage, (b) every type's utility, and (c) quality provision all (weakly) increase for all i . Denote by (q I ( i ) ; U I ( i ) ; I ( i )) and (q I+1 ( i ) ; U I+1 ( i ) ; I+1 ( i )) the equilibria with I and I +1 …rms respectively. Consider the …rst order condition for quality provision (20) in both cases.
Multiplying the left hand side of (30) by F ( i ) one obtains:
Therefore, I+1 ( i ) and F ( i ) I ( i ) provide comparable measures of quality distortions
. Now consider the …rst order conditions for utility provision in the two cases, and omit the argument ( i ) for ease of notation:
(a) Market coverage is higher under I + 1 …rms. Given the common terminal condition 
Di¤erentiating (30) and (31), and evaluating them at^ i ; one obtains:
However, from conditions (32) and (33), one can write
Then, using Lemma 2 and (30), the following inequality can be established,
^ i is ruled out. Incidentally, this also proves that quality provision with I + 1
…rms cannot be everywhere lower than under only I …rms (let^ i = H ). (b) Every type's utility increases:
Note that if there exists a type i such that q I+1 ( i ) < q I ( i ), then, given the common terminal condition, the function q I+1 must cross q I from below at least once (potentially at H ). Therefore, there must also exist a type^ i for which
Furthermore, if at i =^ i it is the case that (S I U I ) =q I < (S I+1 U I+1 ) =q I+1 then the previous argument can be replicated to show that 8 i ; q I+1 ( i ) q I ( i ) : Suppose however, that for all^ i such that (35) and (36) hold, it is the case that (S I U I ) =q I (S I+1 U I+1 ) =q I+1 : This inequality may be expressed as
However, inequality (37) must also hold for points^ i where q I+1 (^ i ) = q I (^ i ): Therefore,
This means that U I+1 U I at all points where q I+1 crosses q I from below. These points represent the local minima of the function g ( i ) = U I+1 ( i ) U I ( i ) : Since g(^ i ) 0 it can be concluded that:
(c) Quality provision increases everywhere. We have established that U I+1 ( i ) U I ( i ) for all i and that q I+1 ( i ) must cross q I ( i ) from above for the …rst time. Therefore, if there exists a point for which q I+1 ( i ) < q I ( i ), using the fact the common terminal conditions, it follows that there must exist a point~ i for which
Using the expression for the derivative of the quality provision schedule from condition (23)
However, note that U I+1 (~ i ) U I (~ i ) and q I+1 (~ i ) < q I (~ i ) imply
Therefore, it is impossible that the two quality schedules increase at the same rate. (2.) Because consumers have single-unit demand, under anonymous pricing, the multiproduct monopolist will sell product i to all consumers for which i = max j f j g : Conditional on selling product i, the monopolist will o¤er the Mussa and Rosen (1978) monopoly quality schedule for the distribution of the highest order statistic F I ( i ).
Denote the Mussa and Rosen (1978) quality provision under distribution F ( i ) by
Now consider two di¤erent distributions F ( i ) and G ( i ) with the associated quality functions q F ( i ) and q G ( i ) : Following (for example) Krishna (2002) , one can show that if F ( i ) dominates G ( i ) in terms of the likelihood ratio (i:e: if f ( i ) =g ( i ) is nondecreasing), then q F ( i ) q G ( i ) for all i . It can be easily shown that the distribution F I+1 ( i ) dominates F I ( i ) in terms of the likelihood ratio. The ratio of the densities is given by
which is clearly increasing in i : Therefore, quality provision is decreasing in I for all i . It immediately follows that market coverage (by each product) is (weakly) decreasing in I: Finally, since in the monopoly problem U 0 ( i ) = q ( i ) and U ( L ) = 0 for all I, it follows that information rents U ( i ) are decreasing in I for all i .
Proof of Proposition 4: The Hamiltonian for each …rm i's problem may be written as
The necessary conditions for a symmetric equilibrium (15)- (17) are then obtained by differentiating (38) with respect to q i and U i , and by imposing the transversality condition
Example: Analytical solution in the linear-quadratic model Let I = 2 and assume the support of the type distribution satis…es H = 5 L =2. In this case, it is immediate to verify that (9)-(11) admit a quadratic solution, which is given by
and hence by
from which we can immediately verify that q ( L ) = 0: From …rst order condition (9), we can solve for the associated costate variable,
In order to check that the second order conditions are satis…ed, suppose all …rms j 6 = i o¤er the rent function U ( j ) given in (39), and consider the Hamiltonian:
where the threshold type j is the solution to U = U ( j ), and therefore, j (U ) = L + r 6 5 U .
Now consider the maximized Hamiltonian
We can plug q (U ),~ ( i ) and j (U ) into (41), and verify that the resulting expression is strictly concave in U for all i 2 [ L ; H ] : Therefore, we can apply the Arrow su¢ cient condition (see Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987) , Theorem 3.17), and conclude that (39)- (40) are an equilibrium.
Example: FMG Copula A tractable functional form to introduce correlation is given by the Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern (FMG) family of copulas (see Nelsen (2006) for a detailed description and for the properties of this family). Given identical marginal distribution functions F ( i ), and a parameter 2 [ 1; 1], de…ne the joint cdf and pdf (for the case of two …rms) as H ( 1 ; 2 ) = F ( 1 ) F ( 2 ) (1 + (1 F ( 1 )) (1 F ( 2 ))) h ( 1 ; 2 ) = f ( 1 ) f ( 2 ) (1 + (1 2F ( 1 )) (1 2F ( 2 ))) :
The equilibrium market share function may be written as follows
These equations are equivalent to (20)- (22) when = 0. In Figure 6 , let F ( i ) be the uniform distribution on [0; 1], let costs be quadratic, and draw the symmetric equilibrium quantity provision schedules for di¤erent values of the correlation parameter . 
